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Abstract. This paper makes changes in monetary policy rules (or regimes) en-
dogenous. Changes are triggered when certain endogenous variables cross speciﬁed
thresholds. Rational expectations equilibria are examined in three models of thresh-
old switching to illustrate that (i) expectations formation eﬀects generated by the
possibility of regime change can be quantitatively important; (ii) symmetric shocks
can have asymmetric eﬀects; (iii) endogenous switching is a natural way to formally
model preemptive policy actions. In a conventional calibrated model, preemptive
policy shifts agents’ expectations, enhancing the ability of policy to oﬀset demand
shocks; this yields a quantitatively signiﬁcant “preemption dividend.”
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most important advance in the monetary policy literature over the past
20 years is the explicit recognition that policy behavior is purposeful and responds
endogenously to the state of the economy. Substantial progress has been made by
research that examines how various monetary policy rules perform in dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. A prominent example of such a rule is
Taylor’s (1993) rule, which has the central bank adjust the short-term nominal inter-
est rate in response to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and some measure of output. Rare is
the paper now that posits an exogenous process for money growth and claims to oﬀer
practical policy advice.
A substantial line of empirical work ﬁnds that Taylor’s or other simple rules de-
scribing purposeful behavior display important time variation in the United States
[Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Favero and Mona-
celli (2005), Sims and Zha (2006)]. Although particulars vary, a common theme across
much of the empirical work on time variation in policy behavior is that changes in
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policy behavior are exogenous. Recent work embeds Markov switching processes for
policy in DSGE models to interpret these empirical ﬁndings [Davig, Leeper, and
Chung (2006), Davig and Leeper (2006a,b)].
1
Because both the empiricaland theoretical work on regime change treat the changes
as exogenous, in an important sense the work is inconsistent with a central tenet
underlying the Taylor rule: monetary policy behavior is purposeful and reacts sys-
tematically to changes in the macroeconomic environment. This paper makes regime
change endogenous, taking a step toward resolving this inconsistency.
2
We distinguish two types of eﬀects from exogenous disturbances.
3 Direct eﬀects
are the usual impacts of shocks that arise when agents place zero probability on
regime change, corresponding to a ﬁxed-regime setup. Expectations formation eﬀects
arise whenever agents’ rational expectations of future regime change induce them to
alter their expectations functions. Expectations formation eﬀects are the diﬀerence
between the impact of a shock when regime can change and the impact when regime
is forever ﬁxed.
The paper shows that even very simple threshold-style methods for endogenizing
regime changes can generate rich dynamics. The rich dynamics allow models that are
linear, except for policy behavior, to display three features that connect to theoretical
and empirical work on the impacts of shocks and to observations about how central
banks act:
(1) Expectations formation eﬀects generated by the possibility of regime change
can be quantitatively important.
(2) Symmetric policy shocks can produce asymmetric eﬀects.
(3) Preemptive policy behavior enhances the eﬀectiveness of policy actions and
delivers a quantitatively signiﬁcant “preemption dividend.”
Endogenous switching shares the feature of quantitatively important expectations
formation eﬀects with exogenous switching. Davig and Leeper (2006b) emphasize that
if monetary policy switches exogenously between a more-active and a less-active reac-
tion against inﬂation, agents’ expectations and, therefore, the equilibrium outcomes
always reﬂect the possibility that regime can change in the future. For example, ex-
pectations of a more-active policy regime in the future diminish the impacts of shocks
on current inﬂation, even when the current regime is less active.
1There is also work that assumes that policy behavior switches exogenously among diﬀerent
exogenous rules for the evolution of policy variables [for example, Andolfatto and Gomme (2003),
Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig (2004), and Owyang and Ramey (2004)].
2Some work examines one-time, permanent endogenous regime changes [for example, Sims (1997),
Daniel (2003), and Mackowiak (2006)].
3This distinction follows the taxonomy in Leeper and Zha (2003).ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 3
Features (2) and (3) emerge with threshold endogenous switching, but are absent
when regimes switch exogenously.
The second feature connects to a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that
typical macroeconomic shocks—such as oil prices, government spending, or nominal
aggregate demand—have nonlinear eﬀects on the economy [for example, DeLong and
Summers (1988), Cover (1992), Hooker and Knetter (1996), Hooker (2002), Ravn and
Sola (2004), Choi and Devereux (2005), Cologni and Manera (2006)]. Some asym-
metric eﬀects have been attributed to nonlinearities in the structure of the economy,
such as real and nominal rigidities or changes in availabilityof ﬁnancing over the busi-
ness cycle [for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Ball and Romer (1990), Ball and
Mankiw (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995), Gertler (1992)]. Surico (2003,
2006) estimates central bank preferences and ﬁnds evidence of asymmetric loss func-
tions at the Federal Reserve, at the European Central Bank, and, prior to monetary
union, at the Bundesbank. Asymmetric policy preferences also underlie the “oppor-
tunistic disinﬂation” argument of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002). In this paper, all
asymmetries arise from nonlinearities in the monetary policy process. Nonlinearities
stem from discrete shifts in policy rules that are triggered by changes in the state of
the economy.
The third feature arises from the emphasis central bankers place on the intrinsic
forward-looking nature of monetary policymaking [Bernanke (2004)]. Because of lags
in when monetary policy actions aﬀect real activity and inﬂation, central banks need
to act before economic conditions deteriorate. A famous instance of forward-looking
policy occurred in 1994 when the Federal Reserve moved preemptively against in-
creases in inﬂation that had only begun to show up in long-term bond yields. Good-
friend (2005) concludes that the preemptive strike was successful, as inﬂation re-
mained low and long rates declined. Preemptive actions of this sort, while playing a
central role in central bank thinking, have not been extensively modeled.
4
The paper applies a simple framework to implement endogenous monetary policy
regime switching. When the central bank’s target variables cross speciﬁed thresholds,
the policy rule changes. One policy process that we use posits that if at date t − 1
inﬂation is less than some threshold, π∗, policy obeys a usual Taylor rule at t;i f
inﬂation equals or exceeds π∗, the central bank implements a more aggressive stance
at t.
On the surface, this setup may seem deterministic: given current inﬂation, next
period’s regime is known exactly. But threshold switching makes forming rational
expectations of regimes two or more periods in the future nontrivial, as they depend
on the joint distribution of all the exogenous disturbances and on the structure of
the economy. Because expectations of all future regimes are updated each period to
4See Orphanides and Williams(2005) for a model of preemptive policy in a learning environment.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 4
incorporate news about realizations of shocks, threshold switching is a special case of
a Markov process with endogenous time-varying probabilities.
The examples of endogenous switching that we present connect well to the behavior
of inﬂation targeting central banks. Strict inﬂation targeting, which is far more
prominent in academic discussions than in actual central banking, lines up with a
threshold inﬂation rate, π∗, that triggers shifts in the policy rule. Flexible inﬂation
targeting, which many central banks claim to pursue, involves more complex triggers
that depend on both the threshold inﬂation rate and some measure of the output gap.
As applied to inﬂation targeting, endogenous switching departs from the usual
linear-quadratic framework by embedding the notion that the central bank has asym-
metric preferences over its objectives, a possibility that Blinder (1997) discusses. If
central bankers would prefer to be 25 basis points below their inﬂation target than
above it, this can create a left-skewed distribution of equilibrium inﬂation.
This paper ﬁts ﬁrmly into the literature that studies how DSGE models perform
under various ad hoc policy rules, such as Taylor rules. That literature adopts the
perspective that policy seeks second-best rules, rather than optimal rules, perhaps
because the underlying exogenous shocks are not observed and uncertainty about the
economy prevents them from being accurately inferred from observable time series.
Second-best rules make policy choices a function of observables, like inﬂation and
output, which the central bank aims to target.
Section 2 brieﬂy compares various speciﬁcations of monetary policy— ﬁxed-regime,
exogenous switching, and endogenous switching. Threshold switching in a ﬂexible-
price model of inﬂation determination is used in sections 3 and 4 to illustrate the
expectations formation eﬀects and asymmetric distributions that endogenous switch-
ing generates. Section 4 details how agents form rational expectations, developing a
time-varying probabilities interpretation of regime change. Section 5 embeds thresh-
old switching in the workhorse new Keynesian model and displays the impacts of
aggregate supply shocks on inﬂation and output dynamics. The implications of a
more plausible characterization of monetary policy behavior—in which both inﬂation
and output thresholds determine the policy rule—are also laid out. Section 6 com-
bines a dynamic threshold— involving past, current, and expected inﬂation—with a
hybrid new Keynesian model to show how central banks might preemptively strike
against inﬂation. In a calibrated version of the model, preemptive policy behavior
is shown to enhance the eﬀectiveness of policy actions, delivering a quantitatively
signiﬁcant “preemption dividend.” Section 7 concludes.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 5
2. Quick Overview of Endogenous Regime Change
Monetary policy rules, such as Taylor’s, are state-contingent in the sense that
the policy interest rate adjusts to the state of the economy, where a ﬁxed set of
parameters govern the degree of adjustment. In an environment with endogenous
regime-switching, the policy rule is state-contingent in this conventional sense, but
also in a broader sense. Namely, the parameters governing the degree of adjustment
of the interest rate to economic variables are themselves a function of the economic
state. For example, high rates of inﬂation may be particularly alarming to policy
makers and trigger a systematically more aggressive response to inﬂation than in
states with more benign rates of inﬂation.
To understand endogenous switching, it is useful to review ﬁxed-regime and ex-
ogenous switching speciﬁcations of policy behavior. Consider the simpliﬁed Taylor
rule
it = κ + απt + εt, (1)
where it is the short-term nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank, πt is
the inﬂation rate, and εt ∼ i.i.d. N (0,σ2) is an exogenous policy disturbance. This
rule is state-contingent in the sense that the nominal interest rate adjusts to the
inﬂation rate, which itself is a function of the underlying state vector describing the
economy. However, the systematic component of policy, α, is constant. All deviations
of it from κ + απt are folded into the exogenous shock.
An exogenously switching rule extends this framework to
it = κ(St)+α(St)πt + εt, (2)
where St is a discrete-valued random variable that evolves stochastically and inde-
pendently of the endogenous economic variables. Now monetary policy is a set of
diﬀerent rules of the form in (1), with a stochastic process governing the dynamic
evolution of the rules. This makes the policy rule rather than just the policy instru-
ment (the interest rate) state-contingent. In both (1) and (2), the parameters κ and
α are given exogenously. The key diﬀerence between the two speciﬁcations is that
(2) introduces a new source of disturbance to the economy, the process governing St,
with important implications for expectations formation.
A simple example of endogenous switching makes the parameters of the monetary
policy rule functions of lagged endogenous variables, as in
it = κ(πt−1)+α(πt−1)πt + εt, (3)
where the monetary rule again is state-contingent, except that the state is now a
lagged endogenous variable. In principle, κ(·)a n dα(·), to be step functions. As
implemented in this paper, endogenous switching can make the functions κ(·)a n d
α(·) either deterministic or stochastic functions of πt−1.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 6
Evidently, there is no sharp conceptual distinction between endogenous “regime
change” and nonlinear policy rules. The former is a discrete approximation to the
latter. Discreteness may have some practical advantages to a central bank that seeks
to communicate clearly about its policy actions: it is far easier to inform the public
about two distinct policy stances—“normal” and “tight,” for instance—than about
the continuum of responses implied by a response to inﬂation that is a continuous
function of the inﬂation rate. Discreteness also serves a pedagogical purpose: it lends
itself to sharper interpretations of the resulting equilibria.
3. The Monetary Policy Process
We assume a monetary policy process that permits the monetary authority to vary
its response to contemporaneous inﬂation depending on the state of the economy. For
example, a monetary authority may respond systematically more aggressively when
inﬂation exceeds a particular threshold and less aggressively when inﬂation is below
the threshold.5
When the threshold depends on lagged inﬂation, the monetary authority sets the
nominal interest rate using the rule
6
it = αStπt + γStxt, (4)
where xt is a measure of the output gap. The coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output
gap are functions of the inﬂation threshold, π∗, and lagged inﬂation,
αSt =( 1 − I [πt−1 ≥ π
∗])α0 + I [πt−1 ≥ π
∗]α1, (5)
γSt =( 1 − I [πt−1 ≥ π
∗])γ0 + I [πt−1 ≥ π
∗]γ1, (6)
where I[·] is the indicator function.
7 In sections 5 and 6, we consider more sophisti-
cated speciﬁcations that incorporate the output gap into the threshold and thresholds
that depend on expected inﬂation. In all cases, the monetary policy process incor-
porates a state-contingent systematic component of policy, so the interest rate rule
used to implement policy varies with economic conditions. This represents the point
of departure from simple instrument rules in which the systematic response of policy
is invariant across time and states.
5The phrase “respond systematically more aggressively” may seem redundant. We use it to
emphasize that the central bank is not raising the nominal interest rate because of the realization
of an additive shock. Instead, it is changing the function that maps economic conditions into policy
choices.
6To focus on endogenous policy actions, in most of the paper we dispense with the policy shock.
7The rule in (4) is written in terms of percentage deviations from steady state. Underlying (4)
is a rule in levels of variables with a state-dependent intercept that varies to keep the deterministic
steady state constant across regimes.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 7
4. A Fisherian Model of Inflation
A simple model of inﬂation determination combines a standard Fisher equation
with an interest rate rule for monetary policy. The Fisher equation can be derived
from a perfectlycompetitiveendowment economywith ﬂexible pricesand a one-period
nominal bond. A linearized asset-pricing equation for the nominal bond is given by
it = Etπt+1 + Etrt+1, (7)
where rt denotes the real rate at t. The real rate evolves exogenously according to
rt = ρrt−1 + υt, (8)
where 0 ≤ ρ<1a n dυt is an i.i.d. random variable with a doubly truncated normal
distribution with mean of 0, variance of σ2
υ, and symmetric truncation points.
In the special ﬁxed-regime case where α0 = α1 = α>1 in (5), equilibrium inﬂation





As α increases, the eﬀect of real rate shocks on inﬂation declines and monetary policy
increasingly oﬀsets the inﬂuence of real rate shocks.
4.1. Threshold Switching Monetary Policy Regimes. The monetary authority
sets the nominal interest rate using
it =
 
α0πt if πt−1 <π ∗
α1πt if πt−1 ≥ π∗ , (10)
where and α1 >α 0 > 1. Monetary policy is active in both regimes and more active
when πt−1 ≥ π∗. We normalize the threshold to be π∗ =0 . Monetary policy adopts
a diﬀerent rule with probability 1 every time lagged inﬂation crosses the inﬂation
threshold. If lagged inﬂation doesn’t cross the threshold, then the instrument rule
switcheswith probability0. Werefer to this monetarypolicy as “threshold switching,”
based on the time series literature on self-exciting threshold autoregressive models, in
which lagged values of a variable can induce a change in regime [Ghaddar and Tong
(1981)]. Monetary policy self-excites in this sense by inﬂuencing inﬂation, which itself
determines future policy regimes.
In this model and all subsequent variants, private agents form rational expectations
based on complete information regarding the policy making process. At date t they
observe all current and past variables; to form expectations, they incorporate the
eﬀects that shocks have on the probability distribution over the policy rules. As
section 4.4 explains, although at date t agents know regime at t + 1 with certainty,
this does not imply that they know all future regimes because the sequence of regimes
that is realized depends on the sequence of realizations of exogenous shocks, υt, and
the serial correlation properties of the real interest rate process.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 8
4.2. Equilibrium Characteristics. Let Θt denote the state at date t. The solution
to the model is a function that maps the minimum set of state variables, Θt =
(rt,π t−1), into values for the endogenous variable, πt.
All the models in the paper are solved numerically using the monotone map algo-
rithm, which ﬁnds a ﬁxed point in decision rules. The algorithm uses a discretized
state space and requires a set of initial decision rules that reduce to a set of non-
linear expectational diﬀerence equations. Details of the numerical method appear in
Appendix A.
With threshold regime change, a positive real rate shock raises inﬂation, as it does
in a ﬁxed regime, but the magnitude diﬀers due to how agents formulate expecta-
tions of future inﬂation. With a ﬁxed-regime, agents know that monetary policy will
respond symmetrically next period to real rate shocks regardless of the sign of the
shock. Threshold regime switching induces agents to expect a stronger monetary pol-
icy response next period whenever a positive real rate shock pushes inﬂation above
its threshold.
To build intuition, it is helpful to consider a policy process that makes the two
regimes very diﬀerent: α0 =1 .5a n dα1 = 25. This extreme example has policy
adjusting the nominal rate very aggressively when inﬂation exceeds its threshold.
In states where lagged inﬂation is below its threshold, the monetary authority still
adjusts the nominal rate more than one-for-one with inﬂation, but to a degree more
in line with conventional Taylor rule speciﬁcations.
In purely forward-looking models with simple policy processes, like (10), regimes
inherit their persistence from the real interest rate process. We make the real rate
relatively serially correlated by setting ρ = .9.
Figure 1 reports the contemporaneous response surface for inﬂation as a function
of the state—lagged inﬂation and the current real rate. States where lagged inﬂation
exceeds its threshold trigger the more-aggressive policy that almost completely oﬀsets
the eﬀect of a real rate shock on inﬂation. This in evident in the ﬁgure from the nearly
ﬂat portion of the shaded surface when πt−1 ≥ 0. States where lagged inﬂation is
below the threshold trigger the less-active policy and real rate shocks have larger
impacts on inﬂation, as shown in the left panels of the ﬁgure.
Turning to more plausible policies, consider the baseline policy α0 =1 .5a n dα1 =
3. Figure 1 illustrates the response surface in comparison to the extreme example.
The policy response when inﬂation exceeds its threshold is not as aggressive in the
baseline policy, which allows real rates to have a larger impact on inﬂation. The
ﬁgure also illustrates how expectations aﬀect current inﬂation. When inﬂation is less
than its threshold, the extreme and baseline policies both have α0 =1 .5. However,
the response surfaces diﬀer because in the extreme case agents incorporate the factENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 9
that a large real rate shock will cause inﬂation to exceed its threshold in the future
and trigger the more-aggressive policy response. Thus, in the extreme case, positive
real rate shocks have a smaller contemporaneous impact on inﬂation, even though
both policies are responding with equal magnitude to current inﬂation. Much tighter
future policy creates expectations formation eﬀects that attenuate the increase in
current inﬂation.
Figure 2 illustrates a slice of the response surface for given rates of lagged inﬂation.
When lagged inﬂation is below its threshold (πt−1 = −.2), the less-active monetary
policy is in place in the current period. A large positive real rate shock, however,
can cause agents to expect more aggressive policy in the subsequent period. Con-
sequently, the contemporaneous response of inﬂation has a kink at the point where
a real rate shock triggers this shift in expectations. The positive real rate shock
increases inﬂation, but by not as much as under the less-active ﬁxed-regime policy,
because expectations of future regimes aﬀect the current equilibrium. Expectations
formation eﬀects show up as the distance between the o’s—the ﬁxed-regime model
with α =1 .5—and the solid line—the switching model with α0 =1 .5 in place. This
distance arises from the expectation of tighter policy next period, not from any dif-
ference between current policy stances.
Figure 3 corresponds to the impulse response evidence other studies have found
for asymmetric impacts of macro shocks. The ﬁgure reports responses of inﬂation to
one-time negative and positive real rate shocks of equal magnitude. For reference, it
also reports responses for ﬁxed regimes that are less active (dashed lines) and more
active (dotted-dashed lines). Monetary policy is initially in the more-active regime.
Following the positive shock, inﬂation rises and the more-active regime stays in place.
Since the more-active policy is in place for both the positive and negative shocks in
period 1, the positive shock has a smaller absolute impact because agents expect to
stay in the more-active regime in the future, owing to the fact that persistence in the
shock is likely to keep inﬂation above threshold. The negative shock lowers inﬂation
and causes policy to switch to the less-active regime in period 2; agents’ expectations
adjust to reﬂect the greater likelihood that this regime stays in place in future periods.
The change in expectations and less-active policy do less to oﬀset the negative shock,
so inﬂation displays a more persistent deviation from its threshold than following a
positive shock.
4.3. Asymmetric Distributions. Asthe impulseresponses imply, threshold switch-
ing creates an asymmetric distribution of inﬂation. The ﬁxed-regime model with
normal shocks implies a symmetric normal distribution. Under exogenous regime-
switching, the distribution for inﬂation is a mixture of the two conditional distribu-
tions in each regime, where each conditional distribution is normal. With endogenous
switching, the distribution is skewed to reﬂect that low or negative inﬂation rates are
more likely to occur than high inﬂation rates. For illustration, ﬁgure 4 reports threeENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 10
histograms for diﬀerent values of the Taylor coeﬃcient in the regime where inﬂation
exceeds its threshold. A very aggressive response, α1 = 25 (top panel), produces a
severely left-skewed distribution whose tail extends into rates of inﬂation far below
threshold. As α1 declines, the degree of skewness declines, but is still apparent in the
case where α1 =3 . The skewness is eliminated as α1 → α0.
Skewness arises from the expectations formation eﬀects generated by the monetary
policy process. The less-active monetary policy is relatively accommodating of shocks
in states where inﬂation is below its threshold and policy is anticipated to remain less
active, so a negative shock to the real rate transmits through to inﬂation to a larger
extent than when inﬂation is above its threshold. In contrast, when a shock raises
inﬂation above its threshold and triggers an expected switch to the more-active policy,
the impacts on inﬂation are dampened.
4.4. Time-Varying Probabilities of Switching. Although the threshold switch-
ing setup we employ implies that agents know the regime one period in advance,
agents’ expectations formation is nontrivial because they do not know all future
regimes. The sequence of regimes that is realized depends on the sequences of ex-
ogenous shocks that are realized and on the serial correlation properties of those
shocks. This section describes in detail how agents form rational expectations in this
environment, clarifying the nature of expectations formation in the face of threshold
switching of policy regimes.
In a state where the real rate shock is zero and inﬂation equals its threshold, agents
know that the more-aggressive regime will be in place next period because πt−1 ≥ 0.
Forming expectations two periods ahead requires agents to compute the probability
that in the following period a shock will hit that causes inﬂation to fall and policy
authorities to adopt the less-active regime.
The probability of future regimes can be characterized precisely. The solution for
inﬂation as a function of the minimum set of state variables, Θt =( rt,π t−1), can be
expressed as
πt = h
π (rt,π t−1). (11)
The smallest υt, which is the innovation in the process for the real rate shock, nec-





π (ρrt−1 + υt,h
π (rt−1,π t−2)) s.t. πt ≥ 0.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 11
The objective function is hπ (rt,π t−1), which is increasing in υt, so the minimization
problem simply ﬁnds the smallest innovation to the shock process that creates non-
negative inﬂation at time t. The probability of St+1 =1i st h e n
Pr[St+1 =1 |Θt−1]=






where ¯ υ is the positive truncation point, υ∗
t is the solution to the minimization prob-
lem, and Θt−1 includes all information at time t−1, which includesπt−1 and, therefore,
St. The integral in (12) gives the probability of realizing a shock at t, υt ≥ υ∗
t, whose
value is suﬃciently large to induce St+1 =1 .
To build intuition, consider an example. The economy is in its deterministic steady
state at date t − 2, so πt−2 = rt−2 = 0, which puts policy in the more-active regime,
St−1 = 1. Given the realization of υt−1,r e g i m ea tt is known and Pr[St =1 |Θt−1]
is a step function: if υt−1 ≥ 0, then πt−1 > 0a n dP r [ St =1 |Θt−1] = 1, whereas if
υt−1 < 0, then πt−1 < 0a n dP r[ St =1 |Θt−1]=0 .
Regime at t + 1, however, is not so easily deduced. Because the real rate shock is
positively serially correlated, υt−1 < 0 creates low inﬂation at t−1 and at future dates.
To trigger a regime change, the innovation at t must be both positive and large enough
to oﬀset the persistent negative eﬀects on inﬂation of the previous shock. Evidently,
the smaller the negative shock at t − 1, the more likely it is that the shock at t will
push inﬂation over the threshold and make St+1 =1 .




π (ρυt−1 + υt,h
π (υt−1,0)) s.t. πt ≥ 0.
Two parameters are critical to the solution of this problem—ρ, which governs the
degree of serial correlation of the real interest rate, and α1, the strength of the policy
reaction to inﬂation in the more-active regime.8 Figure 5 plots Pr[St+1|Θt−1]a sa
function of the innovation to the real rate at t − 1, for various degrees of serial
correlation, ρ. The ﬁgure is drawn for α0 =1 .5a n dα1 = 3. When the shock is i.i.d.
(ρ = 0), regime is also i.i.d., changing each time a shock of a diﬀerent sign is realized.9
Regardless of the realization of υt−1, there is a 50-50 chance of either the less-active
or the more-active regime at t + 1 (dotted line). As the real rate becomes more
persistent, if υt−1 > 0, the probability of switching to the less-active regime declines
because it is less likelythat a shock at t will be suﬃciently large and negative to oﬀset
the serially correlated increase in inﬂation from the date t−1 positive shock. As the
8The variance of the shock, σ2
υ, is also important. Forsimplicity, we do not analyze this dimension.
9The graph is drawn for ρ = .01; when ρ = 0 the model collapses to the trivial solution πt ≡ 0.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 12
ﬁgure shows, for a given realization of υt−1, the probability of staying in the more-
active regime rises monotonically with ρ. This is a manifestation of the expectations
formation eﬀects.
Expectations formation eﬀects also increase with the strength of the monetary
policy reaction to inﬂation in the more-active regime. Figure 6 plots Pr[St+1|Θt−1]
as a function of the innovation to the real rate at t − 1, for various values of α1,t h e
Taylor coeﬃcient in the more-active regime. The ﬁgure is drawn for α0 =1 .5a n d
ρ = .9. For a given realization of υt−1 > 0, the probability in staying in the more-
active regime from period t to period t+1 falls monotonically with α1. Put diﬀerently,
as α1 rises, monetary policy oﬀsets real rate shocks to a larger extent in the more-
active regime and raises the probability that future inﬂation will be below threshold,
triggering the less-active policy. Consequently, larger shocks are required to keep the
probability of switching to the more active regime constant as α1 rises. The presence
of a more-active regime, and a threshold rule for switching to it, changes expectations
so that the economy spends more time in the less-active regime. These expectations
formation eﬀects underlie the asymmetric distribution of inﬂation in ﬁgure 4.
In general, a state where inﬂation is above threshold and the current real rate
shock is positive results in agents placing little probability mass on the adoption
of the less-active regime anytime in the near future. In such a state, expectations
closely resemble those in a ﬁxed-regime setting, where agents place zero probability
on a change.
5. Threshold Switching in a New Keynesian Model
We now turn to assess the implications of endogenous regime-switching within a
conventional new Keynesian model, as described in Woodford (2003). The log-linear
consumption Euler equation and aggregate supply relations are
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1(it − Etπt+1)+gt, (13)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ut, (14)
where aggregate demand and supply shocks follow
gt = ρggt−1 + εgt (15)
ut = ρuut−1 + εut (16)
with 0 ≤ ρg < 1a n d0≤ ρu < 1. Innovations to the exogenous shocks have doubly
truncated normal distributions with mean of 0 and variances σ2
g and σ2
u. For illustra-
tive purposes, we use a conventional calibration: β = .99,ω = .66,σ=1 ,ρ g = ρu =
.9,σ2
g = σ2
u = .025, where 1 − ω is the fraction of ﬁrms that reset their price each
period, following Calvo (1983) pricing. This calibration implies κ = .18.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 13
5.1. Monetary Policy Speciﬁcation. This section focuses on a monetary policy
process where the current regime depends on lagged inﬂation and policy responds to
contemporaneous inﬂation, as in the Fisherian model. The policy rule, in terms of
deviations from the deterministic steady state, is
it = αStπt. (17)
The coeﬃcient on inﬂation is a function of the inﬂation threshold and lagged inﬂation,
αSt =( 1− I [πt−1 ≥ π
∗])α0 + I [πt−1 ≥ π
∗]α1,
with α1 >α 0 > 1.
5.2. Supply Shocks. Figure 7 reports the contemporaneous response of inﬂation to
supply shocks at t for two values of lagged inﬂation—one that is below the threshold
and triggers less-active policy at t (solid line) and one that exceeds the threshold and
triggers the more-active regime at t (dotted-dashed line). For contrast, the ﬁgure also
plots the contemporaneous impacts of supply on inﬂation when regime is ﬁxed and
less active (α0 =1 .5, o’s) and when it is more active (α1 =3 ,x’s). The inﬂation
threshold is set to zero, which is consistent with the steady state inﬂation rate around
which the model equations are linearized.
The ﬁgure highlights the expectations formation eﬀects that aﬀect the equilibrium.
Consider the solid line, which corresponds to below-threshold πt−1, so policy is in
the less-active regime at t. Positive supply shocks raise inﬂation but only slightly
more than they would in a ﬁxed, more-active regime, and raise it much less than in
a ﬁxed, less-active regime. The certainty that regime at t + 1 will switch to being
more active dampens inﬂation even when the prevailing regime is less active, so the
expectations formation eﬀects are given by the vertical distance between the o’s and
the solid line. Expectations formation eﬀects arising from the probability of switching
back to less-active policy in periods t + k, k>1, make the solid line lie above the
x’s—the more-active ﬁxed regime.10
Parallel reasoning applies to negative supply shocks.
11 When inﬂation is above
threshold at t−1 (dotted-dashed line), so policy is more active at t, the deﬂationary
shock triggers the expectation of less-active policy at t + 1: inﬂation falls by more
than it would if more-active policy were permanent (vertical distance between dashed
lines and x’s). But inﬂation also falls by less than it would under a ﬁxed less-active
regime because of the probability regime will switch back to a more-active stance in
subsequent periods.
10Although the ﬁgure is drawn for particular values of lagged inﬂation—πt−1 = ±.37434—the
magnitude of πt−1 is unimportant for the relative position of the solid line. Expectations formation
eﬀects are generated by the likelihood of a change in future regime, which depends on the sign of
πt−1, not its magnitude.
11We thank Rich Clarida for emphasizing this symmetry in his discussion of the paper.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 14
In this purely forward-looking model, expectations formation eﬀects are quantita-
tively signiﬁcant. If agents know that policy next period will be more (less) active,
then the current equilibrium will more closely mimic the equilibrium with a ﬁxed
more- (less-) active policy, even when current policy is less (more) active.
5.3. Asymmetric Equilibrium Distributions. Asymmetry arising from endoge-
nously switching policy is apparent in impulse responses. Figure 8 reports the re-
sponses for output, inﬂation and the nominal rate to one-standard deviation positive
and negative supply shocks, starting from the more-active regime initially. In the
ﬁgure, the positive supply shock’s impact on inﬂation is oﬀset by monetary policy to
a larger extent than is the negative supply shock. Positive shocks raise inﬂation and
cause agents to increase the probability they attach to monetary policy remaining in
the more-active regime.
The negative supply shock produces a kink in the period following the initial shock.
Expectations prior to the supply shock were placing roughly equal weight on future
monetary regimes. Following the negative supply shock, agents revise their expecta-
tions, placing more weight on the less-active monetary regime, since the probability
of inﬂation exceeding its threshold in the near future is relatively low. The eﬀects of
the revisions of expectations towards the more accommodating monetary regime are
realized the period following the shock, causing a further drop in inﬂation and the
kink that is apparent in the ﬁgure.
5.4. Output and Inﬂation Thresholds. Flexible inﬂation targeting central banks
operate under a legislative mandate that speciﬁes multiple objectives—price stability,
stable growth, high employment, safe payments systems, and so forth. The Swedish
central bank, for example, is instructed that “without prejudice to the price stability
target, [it] should furthermore support the goals of general economic policy with
a view to maintaining a sustainable level of growth and high rate of employment”
[Sveriges Riksbank (2006), p. 2].
Flexible inﬂation targeting can be modeled by extending the preceding analysis to
make the switch in policy rules depend on both inﬂation and output gap thresholds.
The second threshold builds additional nonlinearity into the response surfaces for





α0πt if πt−1 <π ∗ and xt−1 ≥ 0
α0πt + γ0xt if πt−1 <π ∗ and xt−1 < 0
α1πt if πt−1 ≥ π∗
, (18)
where γ0 > 0a n dα1 >α 0 > 1. If inﬂation exceeds its threshold, regardless of the
level of output, the central bank responds aggressively to inﬂation and essentially
disregards output gap ﬂuctuations. (The “without prejudice to price stability” man-
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to output stabilization objectives, while still responding actively to inﬂation. (The
“maintain growth” mandate.) When the output gap is negative, the monetary au-
thority responds to the output gap by lowering rates; when it’s positive, the monetary
authority does not respond to output ﬂuctuations, reﬂecting a preference to let the
boom continue, so long as inﬂation remains contained.
Figure 9 plots two response surfaces for inﬂation against lagged inﬂation and the
contemporaneous supply shock. The shaded response surface is for states with xt−1 <
0 and the solid white surface is for states with xt−1 ≥ 0. In the state with the negative
output gap, the monetary authority adjusts the nominal rate to stabilize output (a
positive coeﬃcient on the output gap term in the policy rule). In states when inﬂation
is below its threshold, the shaded surface indicates that policy does not aggressively
oﬀset supply shocks to stabilize inﬂation; this appears in the steep portion of the
surface in this state. When inﬂation exceeds its threshold, the two response surfaces
connect, since the rules in this state are the same. If inﬂation is below its threshold
and output is above its threshold, then the monetary authority does less to stabilize
output. In this state a positive supply shock drives up inﬂation and drives down
output, but the monetary authority responds only to inﬂation, not output. In contrast
to the case when output is below threshold, a positive supply shock drives up inﬂation
and drives output down further; but there is a more aggressive interest rate response
that stabilizes output.
6. Threshold Switching and the ‘Preemption Dividend’
Central banks aim to strike preemptively by aggressively increasing interest rates
in response to latent future inﬂation. Federal Reserve behavior in 1994 is an example
of such a strike: rapid increases in long-term bond yields were viewed as reﬂecting
expectations of higher future inﬂation, despite relatively docile contemporaneous in-
ﬂation. Goodfriend (2005) describes this episode as an “inﬂation scare” and argues
it is an illustration of a successful preemptive strike against inﬂation, based on sub-
sequent realizations of low inﬂation, the ﬂattening out of the yield curve, and the
decline in survey measures of expected inﬂation through 1995 [Clark (1996)].
Establishing and maintaining the central bank’s credibility as an inﬂation ﬁghter is
central to Goodfriend’s argument that preemption is good policy. By demonstrating
its willingness to act boldly to combat inﬂation even before it shows up in headline
measures, a central bank can anchor inﬂation expectations. As Bernanke (2004) em-
phasizes, preemption was a hallmark of Federal Reserve policy under Alan Greenspan.
While it is possible to model preemptive actions in ﬁxed-regime models as an inter-
vention on exogenous “shocks” to the monetary policy rule, as Leeper and Zha (2003)
do, it is diﬃcult to see how that approach can have the lasting eﬀects on expectation
formation that Goodfriend emphasizes lie at the heart of combating inﬂation scares.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 16
Interventions on shocks can shift conditional expectations, but they cannot aﬀect
expectations functions; they generate direct eﬀects, but no expectations formation
eﬀects. Discrete shifts in policy rules that aﬀect expectations functions seem to be
an integral part of Goodfriend’s story.
To model a preemptive strike, we need an environment in which expected inﬂation
can rise in response to a shock. The canonical new Keynesian model of the previous
sections produces rapid adjustments to shocks, so any persistence in output and
inﬂation arises from serial correlation in the exogenous shock process. The hybrid
new Keynesian model, employed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) or Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), introduces backward-looking elements to behavior
that permit inﬂation and output to exhibit the hump-shaped dynamics often found
in VAR studies. When shocks generate a steadily increasing path of inﬂation, the
monetary authority is presented with the opportunity to respond more aggressively
than normal to rising forecasts of inﬂation.
The Phillips curve from the hybrid new Keynesian model is
πt =( 1− ωπ)πt−1 + ωπEtπt+1 + λxt + ut, (19)
where πt−1 enters due to the assumption that ﬁrms that cannot reoptimize their
pricing decisions simply index their nominal prices to past inﬂation. The consumption
Euler equation is
xt =( 1− ωx)xt−1 + ωxEtxt+1 − σ
−1 (Rt − Etπt+1)+gt. (20)
The shocks, ut and gt,a r ei.i.d., have means of zero and obey a doubly truncated
normal distribution. The parameter ωx is an index of internal habit formation.
A preemptive strike calls for a diﬀerent rule in certain states. States that imply high
and rising current inﬂation, coupled with rising expected inﬂation, triggers a more-
aggressive monetary policy rule. Let the vector of current and lagged endogenous




α0πt ξt / ∈ Υt
α1πt ξt ∈ Υt
, (21)
where α1 >α 0 > 1. Υt, the “inﬂation-scare” state that generates a preemptive policy
switch, is deﬁned as
Υt = { ξt|πt ≥ 0,π t >π t−1,E tπt+1 >π t}. (22)
The conditional expectation of inﬂation that enters the preemptive state, Υt,i sb o t h
the central bank’s and the private sector’s rational expectation formed conditional on
policy speciﬁcation (21) and (22) and the economic structure in (19) and (20), along
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Expressions (21) and (22) combine a simple feedback rule with forward-looking
threshold switching criteria to produce a forecast-based policy process. In prac-
tice, most central banks follow forecast-based policies [Bernanke (2004) and Svensson
(2005)], so the speciﬁcation in (21) and (22) brings the paper’s analysis closer in
line with actual policy behavior than do the backward-looking thresholds considered
above.
We choose parameters in line with estimates from the literature in order to gauge
the quantitative impact of preemptive action on inﬂation and output. Parameter
values for the Phillips curve are consistent with estimates in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-
Salido (2005), where ωπ = .65 and λ = .03. For the consumption Euler equation
we use σ−1 = .16 (from table 5.1 in Woodford (2003)) and ωx = .52, a value from
Dennis (2005) that indicates a substantial degree of habit persistence. In this exercise,
“normal” policy sets α0 =1 .5 and the preemptive policy sets α1 =5 .
To generate hump-shaped responses, we focus on the demand shock, gt,w h i c h
produces a peak response in inﬂation one period after the shock. This calibration,
together with i.i.d. shocks does not produce hump-shaped responses to cost shocks,
ut. In this case, disturbances to the Phillips curve can never trigger a preemptive
switch in regime because they do not produce inﬂation paths that satisfy the criterion
Etπt+1 >π t.12
Because the switch to more-active preemptive policy at time t is triggered by the
state at t and its implications for inﬂation at t + 1, the regime at t + 1 is not known
with certainty, as it was in the previous threshold examples. In fact, with i.i.d. shocks
and the present calibration, which generates a response that peaks the period after
the shock, agents expect the more-active policy to be in place only at time t.
Using the baseline parameter values, ﬁgure 10 shows impulse responses to a demand
shock realized in period t = 5 under the endogenously switching preemptive policy
(solid line), and compares them to the ﬁxed-regime policy (dashed line).13 The ﬁxed-
regime policy uses α0 =1 .5. The demand shock generates a delayed rise in inﬂation,
where the peak occurs the period following the shock under both policies. Under
12There is some empirical evidence supporting this. Based on VAR evidence, there is a broad
consensus that demand shocks tend to produce humps in output and inﬂation [Gali (1992), Leeper,
Sims, and Zha (1996)]. The evidence on whether supply (or cost) shocks also produce humps,
particularly in inﬂation, is more mixed. Gali (1992) ﬁnds they do not, while Ireland (2004) ﬁnds
that they do.
13The nonlinear endogenous switching model has a stochastic steady state—deﬁned as the state
the economy converges to when all shocks are set to zero—that diﬀers from the linear model (where
the steady state is zero inﬂation and zero output gap). For comparison, the impulse responses are
reported with the non-zero steady state swept-out of the nonlinear model. Because the stochastic
steady states for inﬂation and output are below zero, the ﬁgures understate the actual diﬀerence
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both policies, the shock raises inﬂation and creates an expectation of higher future
inﬂation. This triggers a preemptive rise in rates that partially oﬀsets the subsequent
rise in inﬂation and reduces output.
What does implementing a preemptive, threshold-switching policy buy the mon-
etary authority? We answer this question by isolating the expectations formation
eﬀects that arise under the preemptive policy, but are absent from the ﬁxed-regime.
Figure 11 mimics the shock interventionexercises in Leeper and Zha (2003) to create a
sequence of i.i.d. policy shocks {ˆ εt}, that allows the ﬁxed-regime policy, it = α0πt+εt
to exactly reproduce the interest rate path that the preemptive switching policy im-
plements (bottom panel). In the ﬁrst two panels we see that under preemptive,
threshold-switching policy (solid lines), monetary policy is more eﬀective than ﬁxed-
regime policy (dashed lines): inﬂation rises by much less. The ﬁgure makes apparent
that in the case of a demand shock, output is stabilized also.
The magnitude of the total preemptive dividend for inﬂation—deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence in the areas under the two inﬂation responses in ﬁgure 11 —varies with agents’
expectations of policy regime in periods after the initial disturbance. Expectations
of future regimes, in turn, vary with the size of the initial demand shock: the larger
the shock at t, the higher the probability that the preemptive state will be realized
at t + k, and the larger are the expectations formation eﬀects. This is shown in
ﬁgure 12, which reports the long-run eﬀect on the price level of a demand shock at
t of a size given by the x-axis under preemptive policy (solid line) and ﬁxed-regime
less-active policy (dashed line). As in ﬁgure 11, i.i.d. policy shocks are added to the
ﬁxed-regime policy to match the interest rate path under switching. The long-run
preemption dividend for inﬂation increases monotonically with the size of the shock,
and can be quantitatively signiﬁcant when demand shocks are large.
7. Concluding Remarks
Endogenous switching of the monetary authority’s policy rule carries important
implications for how private agents form expectations. This paper has employed
threshold switching as a simple method for endogenizing policy regime changes that
has the appeal of resembling actual policy behavior in stylized form. Under thresh-
old switching, where policy rules change when endogenous variables cross speciﬁed
thresholds, symmetric shocks have asymmetric eﬀects and the policy process gen-
erates quantitatively signiﬁcant expectation formation eﬀects. A preemptive policy
rule highlights the implications expectations formation eﬀects have on equilibrium
outcomes. A monetary authority that stands ready to aggressively raise interest
rates in response to forecasts of rising inﬂation can shift expectations, enhancing
the eﬀectiveness of eﬀorts to stabilize inﬂation and output following demand shocksENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 19
when compared to a ﬁxed-regime policy. We refer to the reduced volatility of inﬂation
following a demand shock as the “preemptive dividend.”
This line of work raises issues for further study. First, to what should the beneﬁts of
preemptive policy be compared? This paper contrasts the eﬀects under preemption
to those under a simple, time-invariant Taylor rule. In keeping with the second-
best policy perspective, it is interesting to contrast welfare under preemption with
threshold switching to “optimal implementable”policy rules, as in ?.
14 Implementable
rules are constrained to make policy instruments respond to observable variables,
rather than to exogenous disturbances.
A second issue emerges from the observation that in this paper, preemptive thresh-
old switching appears to oﬀer a free lunch. It reduces the volatility of output and
inﬂation following demand shocks, but is not triggered by supply shocks for which the
preemptivepolicy would not uniformly reduce volatility. The diﬀerence arises because
supply shocks, in the calibration we used, do not generate hump-shaped responses
that would induce policy regime to change. Ultimately, the existence of humped re-
sponses is an empirical question. The present work suggests that the answer to the
question could have some practical implications for the behavior of monetary policy.
Endogenous regime change represents a new mechanism by which expectations for-
mation matters in determining the impacts of monetary policy. Given the magnitudes
of expectations formation eﬀects that emerge from conventionally calibrated new
Keynesian models with threshold switching, conducting monetary policy to “manage
expectations” is potentially quite powerful.
14In linear frameworks, the fully optimal monetary policy is linear in the exogenous shocks.
Clearly, endogenous switching policy cannot improve on optimal policies.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 20
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Appendix A. Numerical Solution Method
Threshold switching induces nonlinearity into each model that requires the use of
numerical methods to obtain a solution. We use the monotone map algoritm, as in
Coleman (1991), which is an iterative method that constructs decision rules over a
discretization of the state space. To initialize the algorithm, we use the solutions
from each model’s ﬁxed-regime counterpart, but also check that the ﬁnal solution is
not sensitive to initial conditions by pertubating these intitial conditions. The ﬁnal
solution is invariant with respect to perturbations in the initial rules, suggesting the
solution is locally unique.
As an example, consider the new Keynesian model with threshold switching and
supply shocks. Implementation of the algorithm begins by taking the initial rules for
inﬂation and the output gap,   hπ(ut,π t−1)=πt and hx(ut,π t−1)=xt, and substituting


















+ κxt + ut, (24)
where ut is a zero-mean, i.i.d. random variable with a doubly truncated normal dis-
tribution and variance of σ2
u. Monetary policy is set according to
it = αStπt, (25)
where
αSt =( 1− I [πt−1 ≥ 0])α0 + I [πt−1 ≥ 0]α1. (26)
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x(u,πt)du + κxt + ut, (28)
where φ(·) is the normal density, a = −3σ2 and b =3 σ2. Expectations are evaluated

















































u)  hπ(ui,π t), fx
j = φ(ui;σ2
u)  hx(ui,π t), h = b−a
N , ui = a + hi and
N is the number of nodes. Linear interpolation is used to evaluate   hπ(ui,π t)a n dENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 24
  hπ(ui,π t)f o ri =1 ,...,N inside the integral. The relevance of threshold switching
appears when evaluating the integral, since agents place positive probability on the
set of shocks next period that would trigger a diﬀerent monetary policy in the future.













































+ κxt + ut,
which is two equations with two unknowns, xt and πt. The state vector and the
decision rules are taken as given when solving the system. The system is then solved
for every set of state variables over a discrete partition of the state space. This
procedure is repeated until the iteration improves the current decision rules at any
given state vector by less than some convergence criterion,  ,s e tt o1 e - 8 .ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 25
Figure 1. Contemporaneous response surface for inﬂation as a func-
tion of past inﬂation and current real rate shock in Fisherian model.
Less-active regime is α0 =1 .5; more-active regime is α1 = 3 (white
surface) or α1 = 25 (shaded surface)ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 26


























Endogenous Switching : π
t−1 = −0.2






Figure 2. Contemporaneous inﬂation response to a real rate shock
in Fisherian model: Threshold switching, πt−1 = −.2 (solid line) and
πt−1 = .2 (dotted-dashed line) and ﬁxed-regime with less-active (α0 =
1.5) and more-active (α1 =3 )ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 27





























Figure 3. Responses of inﬂation to positive and negative real rate
shocks in Fisherian model: Threshold switching (solid lines) and ﬁxed
regime less-active (dashed lines) and ﬁxed regime more-active (dotted-
dashed lines)ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 28






















Figure 4. Distribution of inﬂation in Fisherian model: Threshold
switching with less-active regime α0 =1 .5 and various settings of more-
active regimeENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 29


































Figure 5. Probability of St+1 = 1 conditional on information at t−1,
Θt−1 =( rt−1,π t−2), as function of the real interest rate shock at t − 1,
for various values of the serial correlation of the exogenous shock, ρ.
Drawn for α0 =1 .5a n dα1 =3 .ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 30





































Figure 6. Probability of St+1 = 1 conditional on information at t−1,
Θt−1 =( rt−1,π t−2), as function of the real interest rate shock at t − 1,
for various values of the Taylor parameter in the more-active regime,
α1.D r a w nf o rα0 =1 .5a n dρ = .9.ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 31

























Endogenous Switching : π
t−1 = −0.37434






Figure 7. Contemporaneous response of inﬂation to supply shocks in
the new Keynesian model: Threshold switching and ﬁxed regime with
less-active (α0 =1 .5) and more-active (α1 =3 )


















Nominal Interest Rate (% Change)
Figure 8. Responses to positive and negative supply shocks in new



































Figure 9. Contemporaneous response surface for inﬂation as function
of past inﬂation and current supply shock: inﬂation and output gap
thresholds. White surface is states with xt−1 ≥ 0; shaded surface is
states with xt−1 < 0ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 33


















Nominal Interest Rate, (Change in %)
Preemptive Policy
Fixed−regime Policy
Figure 10. Preemptive policy strike against inﬂation in the hybrid
new Keynesian model. Fixed regime sets α =1 .5; preemptive switching
policy sets α0 =1 .5a n dα1 =5 .ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 34






















Figure 11. Modeling preemptive policy in ﬁxed- and in threshold-
switching regimes. Figure feeds i.i.d.policy shocks into the ﬁxed-regime
policy rule to reproduce the interest rate path in the switching model.
Fixed regime sets α =1 .5; preemptive switching policy sets α0 =1 .5
and α1 =5 .ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE 35

























































Figure 12. Preemption dividend as a function of size of demand
shock. Plots the total long-run eﬀect on the price level for any given
sized demand shock for preemptive threshold-switching policy (solid
line) and ﬁxed regime with α =1 .5; preemptive switching policy sets
α0 =1 .5a n dα1 = 5. Fixed regime adds i.i.d. shocks to policy rule to
match interest rate path, as in ﬁgure 11.